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INDIRECT DISCOURSE AND THE SUBJUNCTIVE OF ATTRACTION¹

The purpose of this paper is to discuss certain aspects only of the two constructions named in its title. It will endeavor first to show that the category of Indirect Discourse is much more inclusive than the treatment given to it in most of our Grammars and text-books would indicate; and will then discuss the rival claims which the categories of Attraction and Indirect Subordinate Clause have upon certain subjunctives.

The definitions of Indirect Discourse found in the seven or eight Latin Grammars in common use in this country are in close agreement, and are so worded as to include in this category all words or thoughts that are indirectly quoted; but in the detailed descriptions that accompany the definitions there is wide variation, with a very general failure to include what the definitions logically involve.

With the exception of infinitives with verbs of emotion, considered by some, I think mistakenly, not to belong in Indirect Discourse, there is general agreement as to the limits of Indirect Statements. But there is a strong tendency to exclude from Indirect Discourse all Indirect Questions and Subordinate Expressions of Desire (i. e. of wishing and willing), either spoken or felt, unless these follow, in connected speech, an Indirect Statement, i. e. to draw a sharp line between what is usually called an Indirect Question and a Question in Indirect Discourse, and between a Substantive Volitive or Optative Clause with *ut* or *ne* and a Command in Indirect Discourse. The Grammars of Lane, Gildersleeve and Lodge, and Hale and Buck all recognize the complete identity of the two classes of Indirect Questions mentioned above. Lane, however (§§ 1705-1708), sharply distinguishes Substantive Volitive Clauses with *ut* from those without *ut*, calling the latter coordinate; and with the latter he classifies Commands in Indirect Discourse (2312, c). Gildersleeve and Lodge (652, Rem. 1) vaguely suggest some connection between the two classes of Indirect Command, but Hale (538) agrees with Lane in making a sharp division. The most extraordinary feature of Hale's classification, however, consists in his putting Indirect Statements in one class as main verbs, and everything else, i. e. Commands, Questions, and Subordinate Clauses, in another class, all as Subordinate Clauses (534, 2). It seems to me he would have great difficulty in proving the Indirect Command or Question more subo: linate than the Indirect Statement.

But the two Grammars which perhaps are in widest use, those of Allen and Greenough, and Bennett, as well as the more recent Grammars of Burton and D'Ooge, suggest not the faintest connection between Indirect Commands or Indirect Questions which closely follow Indirect Statements and have no special introductory verb, and those which depend directly upon appropriate verbs.

Allen and Greenough (586, N. 2), half recognizing this inconsistency, say that "questions coming after a verb of asking are treated as Indirect Questions even if the verb of asking serves also to introduce a passage in the Indirect Discourse". The quoted phrase, "a passage in the Indirect Discourse", can here mean only 'a statement in Indirect Discourse', and the whole dictum is just as true and just as useless as it would be to say that statements coming after verbs of saying are treated as Indirect Statements even if the verb of saying serves also to introduce a question. The difficulty lies in trying to make two kinds of Indirect Questions that differ only in their immaterial circumstances, exactly as do Indirect Statements, which no one ever thinks of so dividing.

Indirect Commands are in still worse plight. Nearly all our grammarians and commentators refuse to consider Indirect Commands and Requests introduced e. g. by *impero ut* or *postulo ut* as worthy of inclusion in Indirect Discourse. According to them, if we read, 'He said he would come soon and that I should wait for him', this is all Indirect Discourse; but if it runs, 'He told me to wait for him, for he would come soon', the first half of the sentence is not Indirect Discourse at all. It is a Substantive Clause of Purpose or Substantive Volitive Clause, and the Indirect Discourse begins in the middle of the message. This seems to me perilously near absurdity, but the statements of our Grammars and the punctuation and references of our text-books mean just that and nothing else. What seems to me an adequate general statement might run somewhat as follows: When actual words are indirectly quoted, the quotation may begin either with an Indirect Statement, or with an Indirect Command or Request, or with an Indirect Question (after a verb of inquiring or of showing), or with an Indirect Subordinate Clause (as after a verb of blaming or complaining with *quod*); and the whole speech is introduced by a verb or an expression appropriate to the first clause quoted. Thereafter Indirect Statements are usually subordinate to an understood verb of saying, Indirect Questions to an understood verb of inquiring, and Indirect Commands or Requests to an understood verb of commanding or requesting.

¹This paper was read at the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of The Classical Association of the Atlantic States, at Hunter College, April 23, 1921.

As to the use and non-use of *ut* in Indirect Commands and Requests, it can only be said that *ut* is found usually, but by no means always, when the clause is attached to an introductory verb, but is found only occasionally when there is no such verb, as is quite natural. Both usages go back to the earlier paratactic use when *ut* was an adverb, and in the developed forms one is as logically dependent as the other. There seems to be a perfect analogy between these two usages and those illustrated by the two English sentences: 'He said that he would come' and 'He said he would come'.

Indirect Statements after verbs of thinking and knowing are always given equal place in Indirect Discourse with those after verbs of saying, and Indirect Questions after verbs of seeing and knowing are considered Indirect Questions as truly as those after verbs of asking. In like manner *ut*-clauses and *ne*-clauses with expressions of fear should be classed with Indirect Commands and Requests as forms of Indirect Discourse.

All this leads, very naturally and logically, to the ordinary Clause of Purpose; always a quoted thought, always the unexpressed wish that lies behind some action as its motive, it surely belongs in Indirect Discourse, along with all the other *ut*, *ne* subordinate clauses (i. e. all subordinate clauses introduced by *ne* and corresponding positive clauses with or without *ut*), every one of them an Indirect Expression of Desire. For, if the ordinary clause of purpose is not to be included in Indirect Discourse, every authoritative definition of the latter construction that I know of should be revised, and it seems to me a very real advantage to classify together all *ut*, *ne* subordinate clauses as Indirect Expressions of Desire, subdivided into Indirect Commands, Requests, Permissions, Fears, and simple Purposes, with a few other notions of similar meaning not so easily labeled. It may be added that the sharp distinction usually drawn between the adverbial and the substantive clauses with *ut* and *ne* is really not very sharp, and, at best, convenient, rather than important. Such clauses when dependent on verbs like *adduco*, *moveo*, *incito*, or *operam do*, carry the notion not of grammatical object but of direction, which is adverbial, not substantival; while before almost every so-called clause of 'pure' purpose the words *eo consilio* might easily be inserted (and are often found) without making the slightest difference in meaning, and then the clause may clearly be considered substantive, in apposition with the noun *consilio*.

This almost universal tendency to exclude from Indirect Discourse subordinate *ut*-clauses and subordinate *ne*-clauses, and, to a less extent, Indirect Questions would also, quite naturally, tend to prevent subjunctive clauses subordinate to them from being classed as Indirect Subordinate Subjunctives, and they have usually been considered cases of Attraction. The confusion and rivalry between these two categories are of long duration. A century or so ago, in some of the Grammars in common use, there was no such thing as Subjunctive of Indirect Subordinate Clause. Every-

thing was 'attracted', even by the Indirect Statement Infinitive. And even now, with the Indirect Subordinate Clause Subjunctive firmly established as a category in all our Grammars, much confusion still remains.

Roby (1774) puts both Attraction and Indirect Subordinate Clause under one rule, it being "a function of the subjunctive", he says, "to express an action qualifying another supposed or abstractly conceived action", thus claiming the same logical but very vague reason for both constructions, and leaving no room for Bennett's theory of mechanical assimilation or for Hale's theory of a shared modal feeling. Harkness (652) similarly says that "clauses closely dependent on a subjunctive or an infinitive are virtually indirect subordinate", though he presents no arguments for this statement, which seems to me to be very questionable. In Gildersleeve-Lodge (662) we read that "in a more general sense Oratio Obliqua is used of complementary clauses that belong to ideal relations", which, from the context, seems to mean clauses subordinate to subjunctives and infinitives.

Lane keeps the two constructions entirely separate in his definitions, but elsewhere makes no attempt whatever to distinguish between them. He discusses the tenses of subjunctives which, as he says, are "due to another subjunctive or infinitive" (1770) and every one of his ten illustrations is an Indirect Subordinate Clause; eight of them are dependent on Indirect Statement Infinitives. In all our Grammars are found so-called cases of Attraction that are easily explicable as Indirect Subordinate Clauses or as clauses of Characteristic. Of the latter type is one of the three illustrations of Attraction in Bennett's Latin Grammar (324): *quod ego fater, pudeat?* Another illustration of Attraction, found in the same author's Syntax of Early Latin (1.311), runs as follows: *fortunatorum memorant insulas quo cuncti qui aetatem egerint caste suam convenient*. Bennett calls the attracting subjunctive one of implied Indirect Discourse, but surely the subjunctive supposed to be attracted is just as much a part of the quotation as is its superior verb.

The Allen and Greenough Grammar says, in a well known passage (593, N. 2), that in the sentence, *imperavit ut ea fierent quae opus esset*, if the relative clause is part of the thought but not part of the order, the subjunctive is due to Indirect Discourse, but, if it is part of the order, it is due to Attraction. In other words it is more likely to be due to Indirect Discourse if it is not part of what was said than if it is.

A thorough treatment of Attraction was made by Professor Tenney Frank, in his dissertation, *Attraction of Mood in Early Latin* (Chicago, 1904). This shows clearly that the principle of Attraction, at the period concerned, was only a tendency, there being, for every case of Attraction, one or more of the same sort not attracted, and that the strength of this tendency varied widely for reasons involving both the meaning of the clause and its position in the sentence. He protests very strongly, and very justly, I believe,

against considering Attraction as a sort of Indirect Discourse. Admitting that in many cases it is difficult to decide between them, he declares that they have very little in common, and that their origins are widely separated, herein differing sharply from Bennett, who sees in Attraction one of the probable sources of the Subjunctive of Indirect Subordinate Clause.

Professor Frank finds that only 35 per cent. of the possible cases in early Latin are attracted, and over half of these he considers due, in part at least, to other influences. A rough count of one hundred pages of Caesar, covering *De Bello Gallico* 1-5, and an equal amount of Cicero's Orations, including those usually read in preparation for College, gives the following results. In the Caesar there are ten clear cases of Attraction, nine of them subordinate to clauses of result, and two doubtful cases, as against thirty-two of non-attraction. In the Cicero I can find only two clear cases of Attraction (*Pro Marcello* 3), with six doubtful cases, where some other explanation is perfectly possible, and 107 instances of non-attraction; moreover, one of the two cases counted as clear (*Pro Marcello* 3) is a *quam*-clause of the type that sometimes takes the infinitive in Indirect Discourse, and so apparently was felt sometimes as coordinate rather than subordinate. If these figures anywhere nearly represent Cicero's general usage, he seems to have rather deliberately avoided the Subjunctive of Attraction.

As to the notion that infinitives outside Indirect Discourse generally attract their subordinate clauses into the subjunctive, it simply is not so. The instances are few and far between; and one slight indication of this may be found in the fact that the Grammars of Allen and Greenough, Bennett, Hale and Buck, Lane, Burton, and D'Ooge, all use the very same sentence as their only illustration.

Nothing has been said so far of that limitation of the principle of Attraction indicated by the fairly frequent use of the terms 'essential' or 'integral part'. But these terms, like the rule itself, merely indicate a tendency, and a rather mild one, at that. True it is that many, and probably the majority, of the attracted subjunctives are essential to the sense, but many are not, and in Cicero, at least, there were found many more essential clauses unattracted than attracted. The one absolutely clear case of Attraction in the hundred pages of Cicero is this: *Pomp. 9, cum maximas aedificasset ornassetque classes exercitusque permagnos, quibuscumque ex gentibus potuisset, comparasset.* The attracted clause here seems not in the least essential, while 45 of the 107 unattracted indicatives in the same hundred pages are in determinative relative clauses, essential to the thought, e. g. *Arch. 5, et erat hoc non solum ingeni ac litterarum verum etiam naturae atque virtutis, ut domus, quae huius adulescentiae prima favit, eadem esset familiarissima senectuti.* So Caesar writes (*B. G. 5.39*), *accidit ut non nulli milites, qui lignationis causa in silvas discessissent, repentino equitum adventu interciperentur*, where the relative clause is attracted but not essential, and he also writes (*B. G.*

5.19), *Relinquebatur ut. . . tantum. . . noceretur quantum. . . milites efficere poterant*, where the relative clause is essential, but is not attracted.

How, then, shall the rival claims of these two constructions be settled when the conflict comes, as it always does, in subjunctives subordinate to indirect questions, commands, requests, permissions, fears, and purposes. On the one hand is Attraction, with its failures far outnumbering its successes; natural enough, but illogical; a tendency only, and one which the great master of Latin style seems rather successfully to have resisted. On the other hand is the Indirect Subordinate Clause, which, whatever its origin, has come to be felt as a definite and almost imperative reason for the subjunctive, since most of the apparent exceptions are easily explained as not intended to be part of the quoted thought or speech. But both explanations are clearly possible, and the unreasoned feeling of each intelligent reader may well be allowed to influence his decision. If any one feels sure that a subordinate clause in a command after *impero ut* is attracted into the mood of its superior verb, and that a subjunctive after *iubeo* and an infinitive is attracted by that infinitive or by the subjunctive that might have been used with a different verb of ordering; and if, when Caesar says (*B. G. 5.5*) he feared a disturbance in Gaul while he was away—*cum ipse abesset, motum in Gallia verebatur*—if, I say, any one feels that the *cum*-clause is attracted from the future indicative of the original thought into the subjunctive by the subjunctive that might have been used in place of the accusative case, he cannot be proved wrong. But, when the evidence and the arguments are all weighed in the balance, I am constrained to believe that the beam will tip rather heavily toward the Indirect Subordinate Clause.

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In *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* 12.49-50, 57-58, 65-66, 13. 145-147, 153-154, 161-162, 169-170, I dealt with various recent translations of the Classics, and especially with volumes of the Loeb Classical Library. It is time to note various additions, made within the last year or so, to this Library.

First, then, mention may be made of Volumes 8, 9, and 10 of the translation of Plutarch's Lives, by B. Perrin. Volume 8 contains the lives of Sertorius and Eumenes, Phocion and Cato the Younger, and a rendering of Plutarch's Comparison of Sertorius and Eumenes. In Volume 9 we find the lives of Demetrius and Antony. Pyrrhus and Gaius Marius, in Volume 10 the lives of Agis and Cleomenes, Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, Philopoemen and Flamininus. For reviews of Volumes 6, 8, 9, by Professor Roger Miller Jones, the reader may consult *Classical Philology* 13. 399-401, 16.298-300. For notices in *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* of earlier volumes see 7.192, 12.58, 13.146-147.